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Angels of Mercy or Greedy Capitalists?
Buying Life Insurance Policies from
the Terminally Ill
I. INTRODUCTION
Through June of 1995, nearly half a million cases of Acquired Im-
mune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) have been reported in the United
States and the epidemic continues to sweep the nation.' Over half of
the 476,899 known American AIDS cases have been reported since
1993.2 Sixty-two percent of these individuals have died The AIDS epi-
demic has helped push the health care crisis to the forefront of the
American political arena as society fearfully witnesses an increasing
population of terminally ill individuals struggle to finance their medical
treatment.4
In response to the financial hardships burdening AIDS patients and
other terminally ill individuals, the "viatical settlement"5 industry has
emerged.' Viatical settlement companies7 operate by purchasing life in-
1. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Dept of Health and Human
Servs., HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REPORT, Mid-year 1995, at 3.
2. Id. at 5, 15. Over 85% of these American individuals confronting the grim reali-
ty of living and dying with AIDS are males. Id. at 13. Tragically, 6611 of these cases
are children under 13 years of age. Id. at 5.
3. Id. at 14. On an international level, the World Health Organization estimates
that 18 million adults and 1.5 million children have been infected with HIV; 4.5 mil-
lion of these cases have developed into AIDS. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, THE
CURRENT GLOBAL SITUATION OF THE HIV/AIDS PANDEMIC (1995).
4. Lee Ann Dean, Note, Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, Viatical Settle-
ment, and the Health Care Crisis: AIDS Patients Reach into the Future to Make
Ends Meet, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 117, 120 (1993).
5. A viatical settlement is:
[A]n agreement entered into between a person owning a life insurance policy
upon the life of a person with a catastrophic or life-threatening illness or
condition and another person by which the policy owner receives compen-
sation or anything of value less than the death benefits of the insurance
policy in return for an assigunent ... of the death benefits or ownership of
the insurance policy.
CAL INS. CODE § 10113.1(a) (West 1993).
6. Although approximately 95% of the individuals who viaticate their policies are
surance policies from terminally ill individuals, "viators,"8 for a lump
sum payout of fifty to ninety percent of the policy's face value.9 This
payment is known as the viatical settlement or viaticum, which is the
Latin word for the Catholic sacrament given to the dying."0
In recent years, sophisticated and highly capitalized viatical settle-
ment companies have entered the market. These companies "capitalize
through either private funds or [money obtained through] the sale of
company stock."" The capital is used to purchase life insurance poli-
cies from viators.'2 The company then "assumes financial responsibility
for premium payments" and becomes both the irrevocable beneficiary
of the policy and the policy owner. 3 Upon the death of the insured,
settlements typically yield a fifteen to twenty percent return for the
viatical company and its investors. 4
inflicted with AIDS, people with cancer and other terminal illnesses also enter into
viatical settlements. June R. Herold, Death Benefits the Living/Industry Grows on
Terminally Ills Insurance, Hous. CHRON., June 7, 1992, at A9.
7. There are approximately 60 viatical settlement companies operating nationally.
Pamela Sherrid, Enriching the Final Days, an Industry Has Sprung Up to Buy Life
Insurance Policies from the Dying. The Idea Is Sound. The Way It Is Practiced
Often Is Not, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 21, 1995, at 56. To obtain a list of
members of the Viatical Association of America, call (800) 842-9811 or (202) 429-5129.
Id. Information on viatical settlements in California can be obtained by the following
companies: Fiedler Financial at (800) 905-0114; Benefit Advocates of Viatical Settle-
ment Advisory Service at (800) 435-8891; and Dignity Partners at (800) 344-6489.
8. Viator is defined as:
[Tihe owner of a life insurance policy insuring the life of a person with a
catastrophic or life-threatening illness or condition or the certificate holder
who enters into an agreement under which the viatical settlement provider
will pay compensation . . . in return for the viator's assignment . . .of the
insurance policy or certificate to the viatical settlement provider.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:202(5) (West Supp. 1996).
9. The amount viators receive for their insurance policies varies from company to
company and is based mainly on the life expectancy of the viator. Kathy M. Kristof,
Living for Today; Terminally Ill are Opting to Cash in Policies, LA. TIMES, June 20,
1995, at DI. The shorter the anticipated lifetime, the greater the amount of the set-
tlement. Id. Although estimates vary as to the total value of policies purchased, the
majority of experts estimate it at approximately $300 million in 1994 and $400 million
in 1995. Id.
10. Cashing in on Death Terminally Ill Sell Policies, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland),
Aug. 28, 1995, at 4C. Secularly, the word connotes "provisions needed for a journey."
Id.
11. Shanah D. Glick, Are Viatical Settlements Securities Within the Regulatory
Control of the Securities Act of 1933?, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 957, 957 (1993).
12. Id.
13. Carole C. Lamson, Legal Introduction in Living Benefits in Life Insurance:
New Perspectives and Developments, 65 N.Y. ST. B.J. 16, 16 (1993).
14. Stephanie Anderson Forest, A Ghoulish Debate Over Cashing in on Death,
Bus. WK., Sept. 19, 1994, at 40.
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Additionally, viatical settlement brokers have also established their
own role in the industry. 5 Brokers act as middlemen between viatical
companies and terminally ill individuals who are interested in
viaticating their policies." If "the broker's client enters into a settle-
ment, the brokerage firm exacts a fee for its services."7
The insurance industry has also reacted to the increasing number of
terminally ill individuals by offering "accelerated death benefits.""8
These benefits allow a policyholder to access twenty-five to one hun-
dred percent of a policy's face value prior to death in either a lump
sum or monthly installments. 9 Unlike viatical settlements, if less than
15. A "viatical settlement broker" is:
[An individual, partnership, corporation or other entity who or which for an-
other and for a fee, commission, or other valuable consideration, offers or
advertises the availability of viatical settlements, introduces viators to viatical
settlement companies, or offers or attempts to negotiate viatical settlements
between a viator and one or more viatical settlement companies.
N.Y. INS. LAW § 7801(d) (McKinney Supp. 1996). Excluded from this definition is "an
attorney, accountant or a person acting under a power of attorney from the viator, re-
tained to represent the viator whose compensation is paid solely by the viator and
without regard to whether a viatical settlement is effected." Id.
16. Jennifer Berner, Beating the Grim Reaper, or Just Confusing Him? Examin-
ing the Harmful Effects of Viatical Settlement Regulation, 27 J. MARSHALL L REv.
581, 585 (1994).
17. Id. Some states have put limitations on viatical settlement brokers' participation
in the industry and the brokers' access to fees. For example, in Minnesota, "[a]
viatical settlement broker must not, without the written agreement of the viator ob-
tained before performing any services in connection with a viatical settlement, seek
or obtain any compensation from the viator." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 60A.972 (Supp.
1996); see also N.Y. INS. LAW § 7808(d) (McKinney Supp. 1996). In Vermont, the bro-
ker may not collect a fee greater than two percent of the amount paid to the viator
on a policy that is the subject of the viatical settlement. VT. STAT. ANN. tit 8,
§ 3832(f) (Supp. 1995).
18. Accelerated death benefits have been defined as follows:
[A]ccelerated death benefits are benefits that:
(a) Are payable to the policy owner or certificate holder during the lifetime
of the insured, in anticipation of death or upon the occurrence of specified
life-threatening or catastrophic conditions as defined by the policy or rider,
(b) Reduce the death benefit otherwise payable under the life insurance poli-
cy; and (c) Are payable upon the occurrence of a single qualifying event that
results in the payment of a benefit amount fixed at the time of acceleration.
OR. REV. STAT. § 743.154(1) (1995). Forty-nine states have enacted legislation authoriz-
ing accelerated death benefits. Lamson, supra note 13, at 18.
19. Lamson, supra note 13, at 18. The percentage paid varies from policy to policy
and depends on the type of benefit. Peggy Hollander, Long-Term Care Insurance and
one hundred percent of the policy is accelerated, the percentage of
unpaid proceeds will remain for the beneficiaries upon the insured's
death.2"
Currently, approximately 215 life insurance companies offer accelerat-
ed death benefits.2 These benefits, however, are typically only offered
when the terminally ill individual has a life expectancy of six months to
a year.22 As a result, accelerated death benefits fall short of providing a
solution for many terminally ill individuals, such as AIDS patients,23
whose life expectancy may be greater than a year, but who are none-
theless faced with burdensome long-term medical costs.24 Thus, the
viatical settlement market is necessary to meet the financial needs of
Estate Preservation, available in WESTLAW, CA52 ALI-ABA 427, 441 (1995). The
most common percentages are for (1) terminal illness policies, 2596-5096; (2) death,
disease, or catastrophic illnesses, 25%; and (3) long-term care such as nursing homes,
usually no limit. Id.
20. Kristof, supra note 9, at DI. The following hypothetical illustrates the
treatment of proceeds under a viatical settlement as opposed to accelerated death
benefits:
Tom (T) owns a $100,000 life insurance policy and has a six-month life
expectancy. T's insurance provider offers to accelerate 95% of the first 50%
of the policy, with the remainder left for the beneficiaries upon T's death.
See id. Thus, T would receive $47,500 during his life, and his beneficiaries
would receive $50,000 upon his death. See id.
Suppose that instead of opting for accelerated death benefits, T decides to
viaticate his policy. The viatical settlement company offers to purchase the
policy for 85% of the face value. See id. Thus, T would receive a lump sum
of $85,000, and nothing would be left for his heirs. See id.
21. Daniel A. Mica, Pioneer in Accelerated Benefits, WASH. POST, March 2, 1995, at
A20.
22. Hollander, supra note 19, at 441. Additionally, accelerated death benefits are
sometimes offered to insureds diagnosed with a specific medical condition that would
result in a shortened life span absent extraordinary medical treatment Id. Moreover,
many providers offer accelerated death benefits for individuals requiring permanent
nursing home care. Id.
23. This is not to suggest that accelerated death benefits are never offered to
patients with AIDS. See Mica, supra note 21, at A20. Viatical settlements, however,
may be more readily accessible to individuals with AIDS because, with an accelerated
death benefit, the life expectancy is generally limited to a year. See Amey Stone,
Personal Business: Smart Money Easing the Economic Burdens of Terminal Illness,
Bus. WK., May 3, 1993, at 160. Additionally, viatical settlements may offer more mon-
ey up front because the entire policy is viaticated, as opposed to accelerated death
benefits that may only allow partial acceleration of the policy. See supra note 20 and
accompanying text (giving example of a viatical settlement versus an accelerated
death benefit).
24. For a discussion of the growing cost of AIDS treatment, see Dean, supra note
4, at 122-27.
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these terminally ill individuals with longer life expectancies at a time
when they are still able to appreciate a meaningful quality of life.'
This Article focuses on the protection of terminally ill individuals
who take advantage of the funds offered by viatical settlement compa-
nies. Part II discusses the moral debate that has plagued the industry
since its inception.26 Part III addresses recent attempts to regulate the
industry to protect viators from exploitation and to ensure the legitima-
cy of the industry. The footnotes in this section present a detailed
survey of individual state regulations. Preferential income tax treatment
for early payment of life insurance proceeds is addressed in Part IV.'
Finally, Part V concludes with suggested steps that can be taken to
protect viators and ensure that they receive the greatest amount possi-
ble for their insurance policies.'
II. THE MoRAL DEBATE
The nature of the industry has sparked a bitter debate between those
who believe viatical settlements provide compassionate relief to dying
individuals, and those who oppose a company's ability to profit from
death.' Critics claim that it is "ghoulish" to allow companies to finan-
cially succeed by gambling on the life expectancies of others.3' The
need for this service, however, has all but silenced this criticism.32 Pro-
ponents point out that viatical settlement companies provide terminally
ill individuals with the opportunity to convert an asset that is otherwise
useless to them during their lifetime into cash.' This liquidity allevi-
25. Lamson, supra note 13, at 16.
26. See infra notes 30-55 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 56-108 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 109-47 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 148-54 and accompanying text.
30. Critics of the viatical settlement industry include state insurance regulators and
medical ethicists. Forest, supra note 14, at 40. In addition, the Securities and Ex-
change Commission appears wary of the industry and is keeping a close eye on
viatical settlement transactions. Id.; see, e.g., Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Life
Partners, 898 F. Supp. 14 (D.D.C. 1995) (granting a preliminary injunction against a
viatical settlement company for selling unregistered securities). For a general discus-
sion of whether viatical settlements should be considered securities, see Glick, supra
note 11.
31. Kristof, supra note 9, at Dl.
32. Sherrid, supra note 7, at 56. A recent study of 2661 families with terminally ill
members found that over one-third of the families spent almost all of their life sav-
ings on medical expenses. Id.
33. John Freeman Blake, Unique Needs Advising Terminally Ill Clients, NAT'L L.J.,
ates financial burdens so that viators can enjoy a comfortable lifestyle
during their final years. Additionally, tapping into these death benefits
before death may decrease the state's burden to support extraordinary
medical expenses.'
Opponents fear that because terminally ill individuals are often in
desperate need of money, the viatical settlement companies are in a
position to exploit viators easily by offering low settlements.' Certain
states have responded to this concern by enacting legislation to regulate
the minimum discount rates used by the companies in determining
settlement amounts.3
These opponents and regulating states, however, fail to recognize the
risks taken by viatical settlement companies when negotiating settle-
ments. First, potential viators consist primarily of individuals with AIDS
and a small number of terminal cancer patients.37 Because the life
span of these individuals varies greatly, and because AIDS is a relatively
new disease with still undetermined morbidity patterns,' the potential
for miscalculation of life expectancy is high.' This risk is compounded
by the potential for advancement in medical technology that may great-
ly increase an individual's life span.4"
Second, viatical settlement companies also run the risk of interest
rates rising after negotiation of the settlement, thereby increasing the
amount owed on borrowed capital.41 Additionally, when determining
settlement amounts, purchasers must take into account administrative
costs, future premium payments, medical assessment costs, attorneys'
fees, and the likelihood of litigation after the insured's death.42 Thus,
purchasers must be allowed reasonable profit margins to prevent inter-
Aug. 5, 1995, at 1.
34. Living Benefits/Curbing Life Insurance Policy Sales Would Tax Texans, Hous.
CHRON., June 2, 1995, at 34 [hereinafter Living Benefits].
35. Forest, supra note 14, at 40.
36. For a discussion on regulating minimum discount rates and their effects on
viatical settlements, see infra notes 95-108 and accompanying text.
37. Herold, supra note 6, at A9; see also supra note 6 (noting 95% of viators are
AIDS patients).
38. The life expectancy of AIDS patients is very difficult to predict because "prog-
ress of the disease depends on the presence or absence of 'opportunistic infections'
that the AIDS sufferer's immune system no longer can destroy." John Freeman Blake,
Life Insurance Proceeds can be Received Tax Free Prior to Death Under New Prop.
Regs, 79 J. TAX'N 156, 157 (1993).
39. Lamson, supra note 13, at 16.
40. Id.
41. Id. Most viatical companies must borrow capital in order to buy the policies
and to keep up with premium payments. Id.
42. Id.
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ference with their ability to assess risk.43 Allowing viatical settlement
companies to compete with one another freely rather than requiring
them to follow set minimum discount rates protects viators from possi-
ble exploitation through competitive settlement rates."
Opponents of the industry also contend that viatical settlements take
away post-death benefits from the policy's likely intended beneficiaries:
members of the viator's family. 5 Yet, many terminally ill AIDS suffer-
ers do not have children. 4 Additionally, by providing money prior to
death, the insured is often able to reduce the financial burden that
would otherwise be left to the family.
Critics of the industry claim that viatical settlement companies should
not be allowed to purchase policies because they do not hold an "insur-
able interest"47 in the life of the insured.' Although as a general rule
the purchaser of an insurance policy must possess an insurable interest
in the insured's life, controversy exists as to whether a person without
an insurable interest, such as a viatical settlement company, may obtain
an insurance policy by assignment.9
According to opponents, allowing the assignment of policies to
viatical companies creates the danger of "hit men" entering the industry
to guarantee large profit margins by ensuring early termination of the
insured's life.' Yet the insurance industry has long been in the prac-
tice of providing lifetime disability and annuity payments to certain
beneficiaries without an influx of hit men.' Additionally, when termi-
nally ill individuals personally enter into viatical settlements, it is pre-
sumed that they will refrain from assigning their policies to disreputable
43. Dean, supra note 4, at 117.
44. See generally Berner, supra note 16, at 601.
45. For a comparison of a viatical settlement paying zero proceeds upon the death
of the insured to an accelerated death benefit allowing partial payment of proceeds
to the beneficiaries, see supra note 20 and accompanying text.
46. Kristof, supra note 9, at DI.
47. An insurable interest when the persons are related includes "a substantial inter-
est engendered by love and affection," and in the case of unrelated individuals, "a
lawful and substantial economic interest in having the life . . . of the individual in-
sured continue." ARK- CODE ANN. § 23-79-103(c)(1) to 103(2) (Michie 1992).
48. Lamson, supra note 13, at 16.
49. Dean, supra note 4, at 117. The majority of states do not require an insurable
interest in assignees as long as the assignment is made in good faith. Id.
50. Lamson, supra note 13, at 16.
51. Id.
companies.52 Finally, state licensing requirements that allow insurance
commissioners to oversee all viatical settlement companies conducting
business within the state further reduces this risk of hit men.5
As shown, opponents' concerns over the viatical settlement industry
are greatly outweighed by the benefits to terminally ill individuals who
opt to viaticate their insurance policies.5 Without this option, many
terminally ill individuals would be left with no assets to help finance
their final years. Opponents seeking to prevent abuse of the system
should achieve this goal by regulating the industry rather than by trying
to eliminate it.1
5
III. REGULATING THE INDUSTRY
In an attempt to prevent potential abuses in the newly developed
viatical settlement market, several states have passed statutes to regu-
late the industry.' By placing the viatical market under the control of
state insurance commissioners or administrators, states are attempting
to protect physically and emotionally vulnerable viators from exploita-
tion by 'viatical settlement companies. 7 Many states have drafted their
statutes to ensure that viators are fully informed before they decide to
viaticate their life insurance policies.'M Additionally, the regulations
protect viators from unfair competition, guarantee the confidentiality of
medical records, and ensure the economic viability of the industry.'
52. Dean, supra note 4, at 117.
53. For an in-depth analysis of individual state licensing requirements, see infra
notes 82-94 and accompanying text.
54. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 56-108 and accompanying text.
56. See CAL INS. CODE § 10113.1-.2 (West 1993); LA. REV. SWAT. ANN. § 22:201-:210.1
(West Supp. 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 60A.961-.974 (Supp. 1996); N.Y. INS. LAW
§§ 7801-7808 (McKinney Supp. 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-58-42 (Supp. 1995); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 26.1-33.1 (1995); TEx. INS. CODE ANN. § 3.50-6A (West Supp. 1996); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 8, §§ 3826-3833 (Supp. 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.102.005-
.102.050 (Supp. 1996). Additionally, states may look to the model statute adopted by
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners as a road map for enacting
their own legislation. MODEL VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS ACT §§ 1-12 (Proposed Official
Draft 1993).
57. See Dean, supra note 4, at 117.
58. See CAL INS. CODE § 10113.2(d)(1)-(3); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:208(1)-(5);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 60A.969(1)-(6); N.Y. INS. LAw § 7807(b)(1)-(6); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 58-5842(g)(1) to (6); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-33.1-07(1)-(6); VT. STAT. ANN. tit 8,
§ 3831(1)-(7); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.102.035(1)(6).
59. Dean, supra note 4, at 117.
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A. General Regulations
Viatical statutes seek to guarantee that viators understand and volun-
tarily consent to the provisions in the settlement contract before
viaticating their policies. This goal is accomplished by requiring viatical
settlement companies to procure a witnessed, signed statement from
the terminally ill individual attesting that the viator freely consents to
the contract, acknowledges the illness, understands the risks and bene-
fits of the settlement, and releases all medical records to the viatical
company.' The purchaser must also obtain a written declaration from
a medical professional affirming that the terminally ill individual is of
sound mind and is acting free from undue influence.'
Additionally, viatical settlement companies may have an affirmative
duty to disclose pertinent information to all potential viators. For exam-
ple, most states that have passed viatical regulations require the pur-
chaser to disclose possible alternatives to viatical settlements, including
accelerated death benefits options, that may be available through the
life insurer.' The statutes may also require purchasers to inform po-
tential viators of the possible tax ramifications of their decision to
viaticate.6 In light of the recent tax movement in this area, this may
be of great importance to viators when determining whether to enter
60. See CAL INS. CODE § 10113.1(c)(2); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:209(A)(2); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 60A.970 (subd. 1)(2); N.Y. INS. LAW § 7808(a); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-58-
42(h)(2); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-33.1-08(1)(b); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3832(a); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 48.102.040(1)(b)(i)(v).
61. CAL INS. CODE § 10113.1(c)(1); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:209(A)(1); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 60A.970(subd. 1)(1); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-5842(h)(1); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-
33.1-08(1)(a); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.102.040(1)(a).
62. See CAL INS. CODE § 10113.2(d)(1); LA REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:208(1); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 60A.969(1); N.Y. INS. LAW § 7807(b)(2); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-5842(g)(1);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-33.1-07(1); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3831(1); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 48.102.035(1). For a discussion of accelerated death benefits, see supra notes
18-25 and accompanying text. In addition to disclosing accelerated death benefits
options, the viatical settlement company may also be required to inform the viator of
possible loans secured by the life insurance policy. See, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAW
§ 7807(b)(2).
63. See CAL INS. CODE § 10113.2(d)(2); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:208(2); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 60A.969(2); N.Y. INS. LAW § 7807(b)(3); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-58-42(g)(2);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-33.1-07(2); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3831(2); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 48.102.035(2). Minnesota, Vermont, and Washington go so far as to require
viatical settlement companies to suggest that potential viators seek the advice of a
tax advisor. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 60A.969(2); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3831(2); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 48.102.035(2).
into a settlement agreement. u Additionally, all viatical settlement con-
tracts currently contain a clause that allows the viator to rescind the
contract within fifteen to thirty days of the contract date.65 To prevent
this rescission period from becoming a bargaining tool in determining
the settlement amount, many states have codified this option to re-
scind.' Most importantly, state regulations require disclosure of the
possible adverse effects the settlement may have on the terminally ill
individual's access to medical or public assistance programs.67 Regula-
tions that impose an affirmative duty to disclose "facilitate free and
informed decision making" by potential viators.is
State regulations also require that all viatical settlement contracts be
filed with and approved by the state department of insurance.' The
64. For a discussion of tax treatment of viatica] settlement transactions, see iqfra
notes 109-47 and accompanying text.
65. Dean, supra note 4, at 145.
66. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:208(4) (stating that the period is the lesser
of 30 days from date of execution or 15 days from receipt of proceeds); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 60A.969(5) (same); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-58-42(g)(5) (same); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 26.1-33.1-07(5) (same). The rescission period varies from state to state. See CAL.
INS. CODE § 10113.2(n) (requiring 15 days from date of execution); N.Y. INS. LAW
§ 7807(b)(5) (requiring 15 days from receipt of proceeds); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8,
§ 3831(5) (mandating seven days from date of execution); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 48.102.035(5) (requiring the later of 15 days from date of receipt or 30 days from
date of execution).
67. See CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.2(d)(3); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22:208(3); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 60A.969(4); N.Y. INS. LAw § 7807(b)(4); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-5842(g)(4);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-33.1-07(4); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3831(4); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 48.102.005.035(4). In New York, for example, the application must state:
Receipt of payment pursuant to a viatical settlement may affect eligibility for
public assistance programs such as medical assistance (Medicaid), aid to
families with dependent children, supplementary social security income and
AIDS drug assistance programs and may be taxable. Prior to applying for a
viatical settlement, policyowners should consult with the appropriate social
services agency concerning how receipt will affect the eligibility of the recipi-
ent and the recipient's spouse or dependents, and with a qualified tax advi-
sor.
N.Y. INS. LAW § 7807(a).
Under the New York law, state public assistance providers cannot require recipi-
ents, as a condition of eligibility, to pursue a viatical settlement. Lamson, supra note
13, at 16. Additionally, the statute prohibits the New York Department of Social Servic-
es from considering an individual's option to viaticate a policy as grounds for refusal
of public funds. Id.
Most of the regulating states also require the purchaser to inform the viator that
the settlement proceeds may be subject to the claims of creditors. See, e.g., LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 22:208(3); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 60A-969(3); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5&-58-42(g)(3);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-33.1-07(3); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3831(3); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 48.102.035(3).
68. Dean, supra note 4, at 146.
69. See CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.2(c); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:205; MINN. STAT.
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department then has discretion to disapprove the contract if its provi-
sions are unreasonable, contrary to the interests of the public, or other-
wise misleading to the viator. ° Many of the statutes also give the de-
partment of insurance the power to oversee the ongoing business af-
fairs of viatical settlement companies.7 This power includes the au-
thority to examine records, books, and files to ascertain whether the
company is acting in accordance with applicable laws.'
Additionally, state statutes protect viators by regulating the flow of
the viatical transaction proceeds. For example, immediately upon re-
ceipt of documents to effect the transfer of the insurance policy, the
regulation may require the purchaser to "pay the proceeds of the settle-
ment to an escrow or trust account managed by a trustee or escrow
agent in a state or federally chartered financial institution that is a
member of the Federal Reserve System."' The funds must be trans-
ferred to the viator as soon as receipt of acknowledgment is obtained
from the insurer.'
Protecting the confidentiality of the viator's medical records is also
an important objective of viatical settlement regulation.7' To illustrate,
the New York statute states in relevant part: "All medical information
solicited or obtained by any licensee shall be subject to the provisions
ANN. § 60A.966; N.Y. INS. LAW § 7804(a); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-58-42(d); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 26.1-33.1-04; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3829(b); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 48.102.020.
70. See CAL INS. CODE § 10113.2(c); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:205; MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 60A.966; N.Y. INS. LAw § 7804(a); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-58-42(d); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 26.1-33.1-04.
71. See CAL INS. CODE § 10113.2(g); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:207(a); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 58-58-42(f).
72. See CAL INS. CODE § 10113.2(g); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:207(a); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 58-58-42(0.
73. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:209(e); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 60A.970 (subd. 4);
N.Y. INS. LAW § 7804(b)(2); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-58-42(i); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-
33.1-08(4); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3832(d).
74. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:209(e); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 60A.970(subd. 4); N.Y. INS.
LAW § 7804(b)(2); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-58-42(i); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-33.1-08(4);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3832(d). A few states expressly require that the purchaser pay
the proceeds in a lump sum. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 60A.970(subd. 5); N.Y. INS. LAW
§ 7808(b)(3). The Minnesota statute further specifies that payment must be made by
certified check or cashier's check. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 60A.970(subd. 4).
75. See CAL INS. CODE § 10113.2(e); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:209(B); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 60A.970(subd. 2); N.Y. INS. LAW § 7808(b); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-58-42(h); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 26.1-33.1-08(2); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3832(b); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 48.102.040(2).
applicable to health care providers under the public health law and
common law relating to confidentiality of medical information."76 Alle-
gations brought against two viatical settlement companies demonstrate
the necessity for such provisions. State security regulators accused
these companies of sending prospective investors "a list of anonymous
purported AIDS patients, showing their insurance carriers and coverage
amount," along with the medical records of some of the patients.' It is
imperative that states prohibit this type of disclosure, not only to pro-
tect the confidentiality of the individual's medical records, but also to
preserve the integrity of the viatical industry.79
These general viatical regulations are the first step in guaranteeing
fair dealing by viatical settlement companies without inhibiting the
viator's ability to take advantage of the market.' The regulations seek
to ensure that viatical settlement companies do not take advantage of a
viator's vulnerability.8' Many states have not yet codified viatical regu-
lations, however, leaving much of the terminally ill population without
protection from potential abuses by viatical settlement purchasers.
B. License Requirements
Current viatical statutes require that every purchaser entering into a
viatical settlement contract be licensed by the state insurance commis-
sioner to engage in business within the state.82 In order to obtain a
license, the purchaser must file an application and pay an application
fee.' In California, the insurance commissioner may decline to ap-
76. N.Y. INs. LAw § 7808(b).
77. Tony Munroe, Companies Exploiting AIDS for Profit, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 20,
1992, at CI.
78. Id.
79. Dean, supra note 4, at 146.
80. Id.
81. Berner, supra note 16, at 587-88.
82. See CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.2(b)(1) (West 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 22:203(A) (West Supp. 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 60A.962(subd. 1) (Supp. 1996);
N.Y. INS. LAw § 7802(a) (McKinney Supp. 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-58-42(b) (Supp.
1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-33.1-02(1); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3827(a) (Supp. 1995);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.102.010(1) (Supp. 1996).
83. The licensing fee varies from state to state. See CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.2(b)(1)
($2833); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:203(B) ($1000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 60A.964(subd. 1)
($750); N.Y. INS. LAw § 7802(b) ($2500); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-33.1-02(2) ($250); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3827(t) ($50); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.102.010(2) (mandating
that fee is determined by the commissioner). After the initial license is given, the
viatical settlement company must renew its license each year and pay an additional
fee. See CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.2(b)(3) ($177); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:203(C)
($500); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 60A.964(subd. 1) ($250); N.Y. INS. LAw § 7802(b) ($1000);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-33.1-02(3) ($150); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3827(c) ($50); WASH.
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prove the application if, in the commissioner's discretion, "it is deter-
mined that it is contrary to the interests of the public to issue a license
to the applicant. The reasons for a denial shall be set forth in
writing. "' Under the broad language of the state regulations, even a
private investor buying a single policy is subject to the same licensing
requirements as a company in the full-time viatical business.'
These licensing provisions have proven to be controversial.' Oppo-
nents contend that licensing requirements stifle a terminally ill
individual's opportunity to take full advantage of the viatical settlement
industry by excluding willing purchasers from the market." They argue
that a smaller number of purchasers means less competition for policy
purchases, resulting in settlements that level off at the applicable mini-
mum discount rates.' Thus, opponents claim that license requirements
prevent viators from receiving the greatest possible return.
Despite opponents' concerns, licensing is not so costly or burden-
some as to prevent legitimate businesses from entering the viatical
settlement industry.' The average fee among states that have enacted
licensing regulations is only $1230 for the initial license and $354 for
REV. CODE ANN. § 48.102.010(2) (requiring fee as determined by the commissioner).
The commissioner may revoke the license if it is determined, after a hearing,
that continued business by the licensee is contrary to the best interests of the public.
See CAL INS. CODE § 10113.2(b)(2); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:204; MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60A.965; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-58-42(c); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-33.1-03; WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 48.102.010(4)(b).
84. CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.2(b)(2). In California, this inquiry focuses on financial
status, past experience in living benefits, and methods for obtaining information from
medical providers. Howard J. Saks, Viatical Settlement Companies Licensed, 21 EST.
PLArN. 186, 186 (1994). Other state regulations also provide stringent licensing require-
ments. In Louisiana, for example, a license will only be granted after the department
of insurance finds that the applicant (1) has provided a detailed plan of operation,
(2) is competent and trustworthy and will act in good faith, and (3) has a good busi-
ness reputation and is qualified to enter the industry. LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 22:203(F)(1)-(3).
85. For example, the New York provision reads: "No individual, partnership, corpo-
ration or other entity may act as a viatical settlement company or broker or enter
into or solicit a viatical settlement without first having obtained a license from the
superintendent, in accordance with procedures established by regulation." N.Y. INS.
LAW § 7802(a).
86. See generaUy Living Benefits, supra note 34, at 34.
87. Berner, supra note 16, at 605.
88. Id. at 606. For a discussion of minimum discount rates, see infra notes 95-108
and accompanying text.
89. Dean, supra note 4, at 117.
the renewal license.' These fees are minimal when compared to the
fifteen to twenty percent average return on a viatical settlement pur-
chase9 and are not likely to discourage even a private single-policy
purchaser from entering the market. 2 Additionally, the statutes impose
the burden of overseeing the industry on the state departments of insur-
ance rather than on the purchasers themselves. 3 Contrary to
opponents' claims, licensing can effectively protect prospective viators
by ensuring that only legitimate purchasers enter the market.94 There-
fore, states should continue to codify licensing requirements for all
viatical settlement purchasers.
C. Minimum Discount Rates
Viatical regulations sometimes provide the insurance commissioner
with the authority to set the minimum discount rates used to determine
the amount paid in exchange for assignment of a death benefit under a
life insurance policy. 5 In a few states, the statutes themselves provide
the minimum discount rates.'0 For example, the Minnesota statute re-
quires the following discount rates: for a life expectancy of (1) less than
90. The author determined the average fee by adding the fee charged by each
state and dividing by the number of states that have set licensing fees. For a list of
the exact licensing fee for each individual state, see supra note 83.
91. Forest, supra note 14, at 40. The following example illustrates the minimal
impact of the licensing fee as compared to the average return:
Dot (D), a 55-year-old cancer patient, owns a whole life insurance policy
that she wishes to viaticate. Erik (E) enters into a viatical settlement with
D. E must pay a $1500 initial license fee, plus $300 each year for the re-
newal fee. E agrees to pay 8096 of the $200,000 face value of the policy. E
therefore pays a lump sum of $160,000 to D. Assume further that D lives
for another year during which E is obligated to pay an additional $2500 in
premium payments. Upon D's death, E receives the $200,000 face value of
the life insurance policy. This is $40,000 more. than E paid for the policy.
The profit to E equals $35,700: $40,000 minus $2500 in premium payments
and $1800 in license fees (the initial fee and one year's renewal). The li-
censing fee, therefore, had very little impact on the total profit percentage
received by E.
Note that this simple example does not take into account inflation, which would
most likely be minimal for a one-year period, nor tax considerations, and is used
merely to illustrate the minimal impact of licensing fees.
92. Dean, supra note 4, at 145.
93. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text (discussing the burden imposed
on state insurance departments).
94. Dean, supra note 4, at 117.
95. See CAL INS. CODE § 10113.2(f) (West 1993); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22:209(C)(3)
(West Supp. 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-58-42j)(2) (Supp. 1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8,
§ 3833(2) (Supp. 1995).
96. See L. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:209(C)(1); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 60A.971 (West
1996).
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six months, 80% of the policy's face value; (2) at least six months but
less than twelve months, 70% of the face value; (3) at least twelve
months but less than eighteen months, 65% of the face value; (4) at
least eighteen months, but less than twenty-four months, 60% of the
face value; and (5) twenty-four months or more, 50% of the face val-
ue.
97
Statutes that regulate minimum discount rates have been met with
criticism.' Although the regulations attempt to provide terminally ill
individuals with protection from possible low rates offered by viatical
settlement companies, the exact opposite may result. Statutes that deny
purchasers reasonable profit margins by interfering with their ability to
assess risk' discourage viatical settlement companies, as well as addi-
tional capital, from entering the industry."° The most harmful effect
of this is the exclusion from the market of those individuals who need
protection most: those terminally ill individuals with life expectancies
of longer than two years who are unable to qualify for accelerated
death benefits because of their longer life expectancies.'
Furthermore, minimum discount rates may likely stifle competition
and become the maximum price purchasers will offer for insurance
policies.'" Although competitive prices may result if one company de-
cides to offer higher settlement prices, the incentive to offer higher
prices is minimal because the growing terminally ill AIDS popula-
tion"° guarantees companies a profitable business.'" As a result,
viators may face a market that systematically sets prices at the mini-
mum discount rates and then uses state regulations to explain the non-
competitive nature of the industry. 5
97. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 60A.971. To illustrate, assume that Tom (T) owns a
$100,000 policy and has an 18-month life expectancy. A viatical settlement contract
must provide T with at least $60,000 in exchange for ownership of the policy.
98. See generally Berner, supra note 16.
99. For a discussion on risks taken by viatical settlement purchasers, see supra
notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
100. Dean, supra note 4, at 117.
101. Id. For a discussion of accelerated death benefits, see supra notes 18-25 and
accompanying text.
102. Berner, supra note 16, at 599.
103. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text for a discussion of the growing
AIDS population.
104. Berner, supra note 16, at 599-600.
105. Id.
Because of these harmful results, statutes should not set, nor give the
state insurance commissioner power to set, minimum discount
rates." Avoiding minimum discount rates will protect viators by en-
couraging competitive prices and by bringing new capital into the mar-
ket."0 7 Thus, an industry without minimum discount rates ensures that
viators can receive the maximum amount possible for their policies.'"
IV. TAX REFORM
As of January 1, 1997, viators will benefit from preferential income
tax treatment of proceeds received pursuant to a viatical settlement."
Traditionally, proceeds received from accelerated death benefits or
viatical settlements have been treated as taxable income."' However,
Congress and the Internal Revenue Service have long been debating the
tax treatment of insurance proceeds received by a terminally ill individ-
ual prior to death. As a result of these debates, the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (Health Insurance Act),'
which goes into effect January 1, 1997, creates an income tax exclusion
for accelerated death benefits and viatical settlement proceeds.' 2 In
order to illustrate how the Heath Insurance Act will benefit viators, this
section begins with an analysis of the general taxation provisions for
proceeds paid pursuant to a life insurance contract.
106. Dean, supra note 4, at 147.
107. Berner, supra note 16, at 599-601.
108. Id. at 601.
109. See infra notes 132-42 and accompanying text.
110. See infra notes 114-31 and accompanying text.
111. Pub. L No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996). The Health Insurance Act adds sec-
tions 101(g) and 7702B to the Internal Revenue Code. These sections affect the tax
treatment of viatical settlements and accelerated death benefits. See infra notes 132-
47 and accompanying text.
112. I.R.C. § 101(g) (1997) (effective January 1, 1997).
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A. Payments Made Incident to Death"3
Under section 101(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code (Code), 4
benefits paid by reason of the insured's death pursuant to a "qualifying
life insurance contract""' are excluded from the beneficiary's gross in-
come." '6 One of the requirements for a qualifying life insurance con-
113. This discussion can be best understood if one is familiar with the several dif-
ferent types of insurance policies a viator may own. First, whole life insurance is a
type of policy "in which the insured pays a level premium for his or her entire life
and in which there is a constantly accumulating cash value against which the insured
can withdraw or borrow." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 805 (6th ed. 1990). Ordinary whole
life insurance is in effect as long as the insured pays the premiums. HAROLD
WEINSTOCK, PLANNING AN ESTATE: A GUIDEBOOK OF PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUES § 10.8
(3rd ed. 1988).
Second, term life insurance insures "against the risk of dying during a specified
period." Id. § 10.7. The insured may usually renew the policy after the end of the
term, but the premiums will be increased to reflect the insured's age at the time of
renewal. Id. Thus, term insurance is usually the least'expensive when first issued, but
the premiums increase as the insured chooses to renew the policy. Id.
Less common types of policies are limited pay life insurance and endowment
insurance. A limited pay policy requires level premium payments for a specified peri-
od of time such as 15, 20, or 30 years. Id. § 10.9. These premiums are more expen-
sive than whole life insurance because they are only paid for a specified number of
years, but the policy insures the holder's entire lifetime. Id. Endowment insurance is
similar to limited pay except that the premiums are higher in order to allow for a
more rapid cash accumulation. Id. § 10.10. When the premium payments are complet-
ed, the cash value will equal the face value of the policy, and the insured will be
paid even if still living. Id.
114. All subsequent textual section references are to the Internal Revenue Code
unless otherwise specified.
115. A life insurance contract as defined by section 7702 of the Code includes
"complex formulas creating guidelines and safe harbors for the interrelationship of
premiums and death benefits, as well as cash values and other investment character-
istics." Blake, supra note 33, at 1. For a detailed analysis of a life insurance contract
as defined by the Code, see Ronald S. Ross, Accelerated Death Benefits' Tax Tieat-
ment Eased, 23 TAx'N FOR LAW. 229 (1995).
116. I.R.C. § 101(a)(1) (1994). The section reads: "[Giross income does not include
amounts received (whether in a single sum or otherwise) under a life insurance con-
tract, if such .amounts are paid by reason of the death of the insured." Id.
If a life insurance policy is transferred for consideration, however, the Code re-
quires the purchaser to recognize the income. Id. § 101(a)(2). The following example
illustrates this transfer for vaue rule:
Heather (H) purchases a $100,000 policy on Cheryl's (C's) life from C for
$40,000. H then pays $10,000 in premiums. Upon C's death, the amount H
must recognize is $50,000: the amount paid by the insurance company
($100,000), minus consideration paid by H ($40,000), and minus subsequent
tract is that the insurer must pay the proceeds "by reason of the death
of the insured.""7 Because the Code draws the line at the insured's
death, proceeds paid "even one minute before death" are typically in-
cluded as taxable income."8 Applying these principles to viatical set-
tlements and accelerated death benefits, receipt of these proceeds prior
to death has been treated traditionally as a surrender of the policy,
requiring the insured to report income to the extent the proceeds ex-
ceed the total premiums paid.'
B. Treatment of Viatical Settlement Proceeds
To illustrate, the Internal Revenue Service (Service) issued a Private
Letter Ruling in 1994 requiring a taxpayer to include proceeds received
pursuant to a viatical settlement as income.'2 ° The ruling addressed a
taxpayer's irrevocable assignment of a life insurance policy to a viatical
settlement company for approximately sixty-three percent of the
policy's face value. "' The Service ruled that amounts received from
the assignment of the life insurance policy to the viatical settlement
company were "not amounts received under a life insurance contract by
reason of the death of the insured. Therefore, the exclusion under sec-
tion 101(a) does not apply to any portion of the gain realized by Tax-
payer on the sale of the contract." '22
The Service instead treated the viatical settlement as a sale of proper-
ty and applied the applicable provisions."' Under section 1001(b), the
amount realized on the sale of property is the amount of money, plus
premium payments paid by H ($10,000). Note that this rule does not apply
if the transferee obtained the property by gift or any transaction in which
there was a carry over basis, as in the case of transfers between spouses.
See id. § 102.
117. Id. § 7702(0(3). The statute does not specify what constitutes payment "by
reason of the death of the insured," although the Internal Revenue Service is given
authority to prescribe appropriate regulations. Id. § 7702(k).
118. Ross, supra note 115, at 229.
119. See I.R.C. § 72(e)(5)-(A) (1994),
120. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-43-020 (July 22, 1994).
121. Id. The Private Letter Ruling dealt with an AIDS patient who sold his $100,000
whole life insurance policy to a viatical settlement company for $63,000. Sale of a
Life Insurance Policy-What is the Basis of Viatical Settlement? L.R. 9443020 (Not
a Precedent), 112 BANKING L.J. 408, 408 (1995) [hereinafter Sale of a Life Insurance
Policy]. "The total premiums paid to date was $40,000 [and] the cash surrender value
[was] $30,000." Id. For a discussion on this type of whole life insurance, see supra
note 113.
122. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-43-020 (July 22, 1994). For a discussion on the exclusion al-
lowed for amounts received by reason of the death of the insured, see supra notes
114-19 and accompanying text.
123. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-43-020 (July 22, 1994).
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the fair market value of other property, received pursuant to the
sale. 2 4 The amount realized less the seller's "basis" 25 in the property
is the amount of gain on the transaction. 126 The entire amount of gain
on the sale of property must be recognized as income.
27
Applying these principles to the viatical settlement transaction, the
Service determined that the amount realized was the amount paid by
the viatical company to the viator.'" The viator's basis was "equal to
the premiums paid less the sum of (i) the cost of insurance protection
provided through the date of sale and (ii) any amounts (e.g., dividends)
received under the contract that have not been included in gross in-
come."" Accordingly, the Service held that the taxpayer must include
in his gross income the amount received from the viatical settlement
company, minus the taxpayer's adjusted basis." The Service empha-
124. I.R.C. § 1001(b) (1994). "The amount realized from the sale or other disposition
of property shall be the sum of any money received plus the fair market value of
the property (other than money) received." Id.
125. Basis is a term used "to describe the value assigned to an asset for the pur-
pose of determining gain (or loss) on the sale or transfer or in determining value in
the hands of the donee." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 151-52 (6th ed. 1990); see I.R.C.
§§ 1011, 1012.
126. I.R.C. § 1001(a) ("The gain from the sale or other disposition of property shall
be the excess of the amount realized therefrom over the adjusted basis . .. ").
127. Id. § 1001(c) ("Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, the entire amount
of the gain or loss, determined under this section, on the sale or exchange of prop-
erty shall be recognized.").
128. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-43-020 (July 22, 1994).
129. Id. "The cost of insurance was approximated by subtracting the cash surrender
value $30,000 from the premiums paid ($40,000)" which equaled $10,000. Sale of a
Life Insurance Policy, supra note 121, at 408. Thus, the basis was equal to $30,000:
premiums paid ($40,000) less insurance protection costs ($10,000). Id. The total gain
was therefore $33,000: the amount received by the viator from the settlement
($63,000) minus the viator's basis ($30,000).
130. Priv. Ltr. Rul 94-43-020 (July 22, 1994); see supra note 129 (calculating gain in
this Private Letter Ruling). The following example illustrates the Service's ruling:
Peter (P), a terminally ill cancer patient, sells his $100,000 policy to a
viatical settlement company for $65,000 (65% of its face value). P has paid
$20,000 in premium payments. Assuming that there have been no dividends
paid and no costs for insurance protection, P must recognize as income a
gain of $45,000: the amount realized ($65,000) minus the adjusted basis
($20,000).
In addition, upon P's death, the viatical settlement company must also
recognize gain. As the new beneficiary of the policy, the viatical settlement
company would receive proceeds of $100,000 (the policy's face value). The
company's basis in the policy, if it has made no subsequent premium pay-
sized that in viatical settlement transactions, "[n]o portion of the
amount received is excluded from income under section 1O1(a)(1) of
the Code."''
C. The New Provisions
Recognizing the need to assist terminally ill individuals with the rising
cost of medical treatment, a new Code provision 2 provides that, as
of January 1, 1997, proceeds received from accelerated death benefits
or viatical settlements are no longer included as taxable income."
Thus, a person diagnosed with a terminal or chronic illness may receive
accelerated death benefits" or assign a life insurance contract to a
viatical settlement company" without paying income tax on the pro-
ceeds, even though the proceeds are not paid by reason of the death of
the insured."
To qualify for the exclusion, the individual must be diagnosed as
either terminally'3 7 or chronically ill." Additionally, the viatical set-
ments, is $65,000 (the amount they paid to P). Assuming there have been
no dividends paid and no costs for insurance protection, the viatical settle-
ment company would have to recognize $35,000 in gain: the amount realized
($100,000) minus the adjusted basis ($65,000).
131. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-43-020 (July 22, 1994). See supra notes 114-19 and accompa-
nying text for an explanation of the exclusion under section 101(a)(1).
132. I.R.C. § 101(g) (1997) (effective January 1, 1997).
133. Id.
134. Id. § 101(g)(1) (effective January 1, 1997).
For purposes of this section, the following amounts shall be treated as an
amount paid by reason of the death of an insured:
(A) Any amount received under a life insurance contract on the life
of an insured who is a terminally ill individual.
(B) Any amount received under a life insurance contract on the life
of an insured who is a chronically ill individual.
Id.
135. Id. § 101(g)(2)(A) (effective January 1, 1997).
If any portion of the death benefit under a life insurance contract on the life
of an insured . . . is sold or assigned to a viatical settlement provider, the
amount paid for the sale or assignment of such portion shall be treated as
an amount paid under the life insurance contract by reason of the death of
such insured.
Id.
136. Id. For a discussion of proceeds paid "by reason of the death of the insured,"
see supra notes 114-19 and accompanying text.
137. "Terminally ill" means any "individual who has been certified by a physician as
having an illness or physical condition which can reasonably be expected to result in
death in 24 months or less after the date of the certification." I.R.C. § 101(g)(4)(A)
(effective January 1, 1997).
138. "Chronically ill" is defined as someone who is unable to perform "at least two
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tlement provider must be a person or company "regularly engaged in
the trade or business of purchasing, or taking assignments of, life insur-
ance contracts" on the lives of terminally or chronically ill individu-
als.'3 Additionally, the viatical settlement company must be licensed
by the state 4 ' in which the insured resides or, in the case of a state
that does not have licensing requirements, meet the general standard of
the Viatical Settlements Model Act of the National Association of Insur-
ance Commissioners.'' The new Code section also requires viatical
settlement companies to pay reasonable amounts for assignment of the
viator's policy.'
The new tax provisions mark an essential breakthrough for viatical
settlement companies. By providing an income tax exclusion for viatical
settlement proceeds,' Congress and the Internal Revenue Service
have recognized the legitimacy of the industry.' The income tax
exclusion also provides a much needed benefit to potential viators.
From a humanitarian standpoint, families facing the tragedy of a termi-
nal illness and struggling to finance extraordinary medical costs should
not be further burdened by taxation.45 As a more practical matter, ac-
cess to viatical settlements is critical to those terminally ill individuals
who do not have health insurance.'46 Tax incentives will save federal
activities of daily living . . . due to a loss of functional capacity." I.R.C. §
7702B(c)(2)(A)(i) (effective January 1, 1997). "Activities of daily living" include tasks
such as eating, bathing, and dressing. Id. § 7702B(c)(2)(B)(i)-(vi) (effective January 1,
1997).
The excludable amount for a chronically ill individual is capped at $175 per day
($63,875 annually), adjusted for inflation. Id. § 7702B(d)(4) (effective January 1, 1997).
Accelerated benefits paid to a chronically ill individual are excludable if the payment
is for actual costs of long-term care that are not compensated for by insurance. Id. §
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dollars by encouraging these individuals to access their life insurance
policies in order to pay their health care costs rather than rely on pub-
lic assistance.4 ' For these reasons, the new Code provisions advance
the legitimacy of the viatical settlement industry.
V. CONCLUSION
As the terminally ill population continues to increase rapidly," the
need for the viatical settlement industry becomes essential. Although
opponents question the morality of profiting from death,'49 viatical set-
tlement companies allow viators to convert an asset to cash that is
otherwise unavailable to them during their lives. For many terminally ill
individuals, this is the only financial option available.
Viatical legislation should focus on protecting viators who wish to
viaticate their policies in order to finance the high cost of living with a
terminal illness. While some states have placed regulations on the mar-
ket to ensure the legitimacy of the industry,"w many states have yet to
take the necessary regulatory steps to protect viators. These regulations
include licensing requirements, mandatory disclosure of pertinent infor-
mation, confidentiality of medical information, and continuous oversight
by state insurance commissioners."
States should also refrain from setting minimum discount rates for
determining viatical settlement amounts.52 Although aimed at prevent-
ing abuses, minimum discount rates actually impede aviator's ability to
obtain the highest possible payout." Finally, viators should take ad-
vantage of the new Code section that provides an income tax exclusion
for accelerated death benefits and proceeds received pursuant to a
viatical settlement." These changes will protect terminally ill individ-
uals who choose to sell their life insurance policies in order to maintain
a comfortable lifestyle during their final years.
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